

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 180220
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

66011
DRAFTED BY:P:DTICE
APPROVED BY:D;TICE
S/S-O:LRFLEISCHER
-----063323 172301Z /66

O 172122Z JUL 78 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 180220

NODIS
FOR UNDER SECY NEWSOM

FOLLOWING REPEAT TEL AVIV 8967 ACTION SECSTATE INFO CAIRO
LONDON BONN DATED JUL 16:

QTE:S E C R E T TEL AVIV 8967

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

BONN FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

LONDON FOR ATHERTON AND SAUNDERS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: IS, EG, PEPR, PBOR
SUBJECT: WEIZMAN ON HIS TALKS WITH SADAT

REF: CAIRO 17127

SUMMARY: WEIZMAN BRIEFED ME JULY 16 ON HIS TALKS WITH SADAT.
WITH HERUTNIKA ZIPPORI, DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER PRESENT PLUS
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 180220

A STENOTYPIST, WEIZMAN'S PRESENTATION WAS DIRECTED AS MUCH AT
HIS PARTY AND THE PRIME MINISTER AS AT ME. WEIZMAN SAID
HE HAD TOLD SADAT TO LAY OFF BEGIN AND DAYAN. THERE WAS ONLY
ONE GOI, BEGIN WAS ITS PRIME MINISTER AND DAYAN ITS
FOREIGN MINISTER. SADAT HAD TO DEAL WITH THEM; HAD TO STOP
CHOOSING WHICH ISRAELI HE WOULD NEGOTIATE WITH. WEIZMAN
COULD NOT REMAIN HIS GOLDEN BOY. IF SADAT PERSISTED ON HIS
PRESENT COURSE, NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE. SADAT
TOLD WEIZMAN THAT OCTOBER WAS A CRITICAL MONTH AND ISRAEL
HAD TO DON ONE OF THREE THINGS BEFORE THEN TO KEEP THE PROCESS

GOING: 1) SIGN A PEACE TREAT; 2) WITHDRAW FROM AREA FROM EL ARISH TO RAS MOHAMED; OR 3) AGREE TO EGYPTIAN ENCLAVES AT EL ARISH AND ST. CATHERINE. (IT WAS THESE POSSIBILITIES THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET WOULD BE CONSIDERING JULY 23.) IF ISRAEL DID NOT PROVE FLEXIBLE, SADAT MIGHT MAINTAIN SINAI II AGREEMENT, BUT ASK UNEF TO LEAVE. SADAT SAID JERUSALEM COULD REMAIN UNITED, BUT THERE HAD TO BE "MOSLEM" AREA OVER WHICH "MOSLEM" FLAG WOULD FLY. PEACE TREATY CONCERNING WEST BANK AND GAZA SHOULD BE SIGNED AFTER WHICH DETAILS REGARDING ISRAEL'S SECURITY COULD BE WORKED OUT IN FEW MONTHS. IF GOI AND EGYPT COULD AGREE, AND IF HUSSEIN WOULD NOT COME IN, SADAT WOULD TAKE OVER JORDANIAN ROLE, FOR EXAMPLE BY SENDING EGYPTIAN POLICE TO WEST BANK. SADAT EMPHASIZED REQUIREMENT OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM WEST BANK AND GAZA. THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF MINOR BORDER MODIFICATIONS, REASONABLE BORDERS, ETC. SADAT AGREED TO IDF PRESENCE ON WEST BANK BUT TIME FRAME WAS VAGUE. NO CLARIFICATION ON WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS. WEIZMAN ASKED US TO CONVINCE SADAT THAT HE IS ENDANGERING NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH HIS ATTACKS ON BEGIN. WEIZMAN EXPECTED NOTHING TO EMERGE FROM LONDON, AND WORRIED ABOUT NEXT STEPS. IF ONLY HE RECEIVED INVITATION TO VISIT ALEXANDRIA, CABINET WOULD PROBABLY NOT ALLOW HIM TO ACCEPT, AT LEAST IN ITS PRESENT MOOD. END SUMMARY.

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 180220

1. I HAD AN HOUR WITH WEIZMAN THE EARLY EVENING OF JULY 16 DURING WHICH HE HELD FORTH IN SOMEWHAT CIRCUMSCRIBED FASHION ON HIS TALKS WITH SADAT. HIS RESTRAINT WAS CAUSED BY THE STENOYPTIST AND BY THE PRESENCE OF DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER ZIPPORI WHOSE HERUT CREDENTIALS ARE GILT EDGED. ALSO PRESENT WERE ARIEH SHURIE, WEIZMAN'S ADC, VIETS AND BLACKWILL.

2. THE FIRST 20 MINUTES OF WEIZMAN'S PRESENTATION WAS CLEARLY DIRECTED NOT PRIMARILY AT ME, BUT AT THE HERUT PARTY, THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE CABINET. HE SAID HE HAD TOLD SADAT IN THEIR 3 -1/2 HOUR ONE-ON-ONE ENCOUNTER THAT SADAT COULD NOT GO ON PLAYING ISRAELI POLITICIANS OFF AGAINST ONE ANOTHER. HE COULD NOT CONTINUE TO SAY HE DID NOT WANT TO SEE BEGIN NOR DAYAN BUT PREFERRED WEIZMAN. WEIZMAN SAID HE TOLD SADAT THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WAS NOT A TRIBE. BEGIN WAS THE PRIME MINISTER AND DAYAN WAS THE FOREIGN MINISTER. NOTHING WOULD IMPROVE UNLESS SADAT SAW BEGIN. WEIZMAN COULD NOT EXCLUSIVELY REMAIN SADAT'S FAVORITE ISRAELI. SADAT WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE GOI. THE ISRAELI PUBLIC HAD THE FEELING THAT SADAT WAS TRYING TO DIVIDE THE GOVERNMENT, AND ATTEMPTING TO CREATE A RIFT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE. ACCORDING TO WEIZMAN, HE DELIVERED THIS MESSAGE TO SADAT BLUNTLY. I ASKED WEIZMAN IF HE THOUGHT SADAT HAD TAKEN THIS ADVICE ON BOARD. WEIZMAN RESPONDED THAT HE THOUGHT NOT, SINCE SADAT HAD DONE THE SAME THING AGAIN PUBLICLY AFTER WEIZMAN HAD LEFT AUSTRIA.

2. WEIZMAN WENT ON AND ON IN THIS REPETITIVE VEIN. HE SAID HE HAD SUGGESTED TO SADAT THAT HE INVITE OTHER ISRAELI OFFICIALS TO EGYPT, EVEN SHARON. SADAT SAID THAT WAS POSSIBLE, BUT WEIZMAN WAS HIS FAVORITE, THE ONE HE WANTED TO NEGOTIATE WITH. WEIZMAN CONTINUED THAT AT TODAY'S CABINET MEETING, THE TENDENCY WAS CLEARLY TO TELL SADAT THE NEXT TIME HE WANTED TO SEE A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT, THE GOI WOULD DECIDE WHOM TO SEND. THAT WAS THE SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 180220

MEANING OF THE PHRASEOLOGY ON RECIPROCITY THAT APPEARED IN TODAY'S CABINET STATEMENT.

3. I INTERVENED TO SAY THAT IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING SADAT THOUGHT WEIZMAN WOULD SOON MEET HIM IN ALEXANDRIA. WEIZMAN SAID SADAT MIGHT THINK SO BUT, "I DOUBT IF I WILL. THE CABINET PROBABLY WON'T LET ME." WEIZMAN SAID HE HAD DIFFERED WITH HIS CABINET COLLEAGUES IN THE PAST ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER HE SHOULD MAINTAIN DIRECT LINKS WITH SADAT. HE SAID HE WAS NOT SURE NOW. (THIS WAS ONE OF THE MORE BLATANT EXAMPLES OF WEIZMAN'S DIRECTING HIS REMARKS AT ZIPPORI. I DON'T BELIEVE FOR A MOMENT HE MEANT IT.)

4. AFTER THIS LONG EXPOSITION, WEIZMAN, WITH ZIPPORI LISTENING CAREFULLY, THEN TICKED OFF WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS THE SUBSTANCE OF HIS TALK WITH SADAT. HE SAID THAT SADAT HAD TOLD HIM THAT AFTER RAMADAN, DURING THE FEAST OF BAIRAM, HE WAS GOING TO MT. SINAI TO PRAY. HE WANTED TO BUILD A MOSQUE, A CHURCH AND A SYNAGOGUE THERE. WEIZMAN SAID HE WAS FLABBERGASTED WITH THE IDEA BUT ASSURED SADAT THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULDN'T SHOOT HIM.

5. SADAT THEN ARGUED THAT ISRAEL HAD NOT PROPERLY RESPONDED TO HIS "JERUSALEM INITIATIVE". IF ISRAEL HAD IMMEDIATELY ANNOUNCED THAT IT WOULD UNILATERALLY WITHDRAW FROM THE AREA BETWEEN EL ARISH AND RAS MOHAMED, "ALL THE WIND WOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN OUT OF MY SAILS". EVEN THOUGH THE GOI HAD MISSED THAT OPPORTUNITY, IT WAS NOT TOO LATE. IF ISRAEL WERE NOW TO MAKE SUCH A UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL, SADAT WOULD HAVE SOMETHING TO SHOW FROM THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT. BUT THERE WAS NOT ALL THE TIME IN THE WORLD. HE NEEDED SOMETHING BEFORE OCTOBER. (ACCORDING TO WEIZMAN, GAMASY TOLD HIM THAT NOVEMBER, THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE VISIT TO JERUSALEM, WAS EQUALLY IMPORTANT SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 180220

TO SADAT.) AGAIN, WEIZMAN INDICATED THAT HE WAS AS STUNNED WITH THIS IDEA AS HE WAS WITH SADAT'S PROPOSED VISIT TO MT. SINAI.

6. THERE WERE MORE SURPRISES TO COME. SADAT THEN MOVED TO HIS ENCLAVE IDEA. WHY COULD ISRAEL NOT AGREE TO AN EGYPTIAN ENCLAVE AT EL ARISH WHERE SADAT WOULD HAVE HIS ADMINISTRATION, WHERE HE WOULD BUILD A "PEACE CENTER". ASSAD WOULD COME. HUSSEIN WOULD COME. EVEN ARAFAT WOULD COME. SADAT ALSO WANTED AN ENCLAVE AT ST. CATHERINES: "HE COULD TALK TO GOD IN ONE ENCLAVE AND THE ISRAELIS IN THE OTHER." ACCORDING TO WEIZMAN, SADAT FIRST ARGUED THAT "ISRAEL MUST DO IT FOR ME", BUT THEN CAUGHT HIMSELF AND SAID THAT "IT MUST BE DONE FOR EGYPT", AND IT MUST BE DONE BEFORE OCTOBER.

7. SADAT'S REMARKS ON OCTOBER RENEWAL OF UNEF, PRESENTED A NEW WRINKLE FOR WEIZMAN, ONE HE HAD NOT THOUGHT OF. SADAT AGREED THAT ACCORDING TO THE BOOK, THE INTERIM AGREEMENT COULD ONLY BE TERMINATED IF IT WERE SUPERCEDED BY ANOTHER AGREEMENT. BUT EXTENSION OF THE UN FORCE HAD TO BE AUTHORIZED BY SADAT. HE COULD THUS DECIDE THAT THE AGREEMENT COULD CONTINUE, BUT THE UN WOULD HAVE TO GO. SADAT EMPHASIZED AGAIN AND AGAIN THAT ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO MAKE SOME MOVEMENT FORWARD IN ORDER TO PREVENT SOMETHING BAD HAPPENING IN OCTOBER. THE BEST THING WOULD BE TO SIGN A PEACE TREATY. ALTERNATIVELY, PARTIAL (UNILATERAL) WITHDRAWAL TO THE EL ARISH/RAS MOHAMMAD LINE OR THE ENCLAVES, WOULD BE NECESSARY. WEIZMAN SAID SADAT WAS DISINCLINED TO DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF SUCH A TREATY. HE DID SAY THAT WHEN THE TREATY WAS SIGNED, THE ISRAELI MILITARY ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE TERMINATED AND DISCUSSIONS WOULD THEN TAKE PLACE ABOUT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. ISRAEL WOULD NOT HAVE TO WITHDRAW UNTIL THOSE SECURITY ARRANGEMENT WERE FINALIZED BUT THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD NOT TAKE MORE THAN A FEW MONTHS. (I QUERIED THE TIME - HE THOUGHT SADAT HAD SAID "MONTHS".) SADAT'S MESSAGE, WEIZMAN NOTED, WAS FOR ISRAEL TO SIGN A PEACE TREATY, THEN
SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 180220

TALK ABOUT DETAILS. WEIZMAN NOTED THAT HE DID NOT MUCH LIKE THAT APPROACH.

8. I ASKED WEIZMAN IF JERUSALEM HAD COME UP. HE SAID SADAT HAD AGREED THAT JERUSALEM COULD STAY UNITED. HE HAD TALKED VAGUELY ABOUT AN ARAB MUNICIPALITY, AN ISRAELI MUNICIPALITY AND SOME KIND OF JOINT MANAGEMENT. HE HAD ALSO AVERTED TO THE IDEA OF A ONE MILE "MOSLEM" SQUARE IN JERUSALEM OVER WHICH WOULD FLY A "MOSLEM" FLAG. SADAT DID NOT USE THE TERMINOLOGY "OLD CITY" OR "ARAB CITY". RECOGNITION WOULD BE THROUGH THE FLAG, NOT BY WALL OR FENCE. (ZIPPORI LEFT THE ROOM AT THIS POINT AND DID NOT RETURN).

9. NEXT PROBED WEIZMAN ON THE ROLE OF JORDAN IN ALL THIS. HE SAID HE HAD ASKED SADAT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN ON A UNITED JERUSALEM IF HUSSEIN DIDN'T ACCEPT THE IDEA. SADAT HAD RESPONDED "I'LL COME ALONG". THERE HAD ALSO BEEN SOME TALK OF COMBINED JORDANIAN/ISRAELI POLICE ON THE WEST BANK

AND, IF HUSSEIN DID NOT PARTICIPATE, COMBINED EGYPTIAN/ISRAELI POLICE. AT THIS POINT, WEIZMAN WAS CAREFUL TO STRESS TO SADAT THAT ALTHOUGH HE WAS LISTENING TO THESE IDEAS, IT "DIDN'T MEAN ISRAEL SHALL AGREE".

10. WEIZMAN THEN SAID HE WAS WORRIED THAT SADAT HAD "CRYSTALLIZED" THE IDEA THAT ISRAEL WOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. HE SEEMED TO AGREE THAT THE IDF COULD REMAIN IN THOSE TERRITORIES FOR A WHILE, BUT NO TIMEFRAME WAS MENTIONED. NOTHING WAS CLARIFIED WITH RESPECT TO ISRAELI WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS. WEIZMAN SAID THE WHOLE CONVERSATION WAS ELEVATED. IF ISRAELIS WOULD WIN THE LOVE OF THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE, EVERYTHING WAS POSSIBLE: DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, COMMERCIAL EXCHANGES, WATER FROM THE NILE TO THE NEGEV, OIL FROM EGYPT TO ISRAEL, ETC. BUT SADAT WOULD NOT BE PRESSED ON THE DETAILS OR HOW
SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 180220

OR WHEN THIS WOULD ALL HAPPEN.

11. SAYING THAT HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A CRISIS IN THE MONTHS TO COME, WEIZMAN SAID THAT DESPITE SADAT'S NICETIES--THE HUGS AND THE COMPLIMENTS--THE STATE OF ISRAEL HAD TO FIND A SOLUTION FOR WEST BANK AND GAZA. HE DID NOT HAVE SUCH A SOLUTION. PERHAPS BEGIN AND DAYN DID. BUT HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE ISRAELI OFFER TO WITHDRAW FROM SINAI "LOCK, STOCK AND BARREL" WAS BEING UNDERMINED BY SADAT'S CONTINUOUS CRITICISM OF BEGIN. "I CAN'T GO ON BEING A GOODY, GOODY", SAID WEIZMAN.

12. HE ASKED THAT THE US GET THAT MESSAGE THROUGH TO SADAT. IF SADAT CONTINUED HIS PRESENT PATH, THE WHOLE THING WOULD FALL APART. WEIZMAN CONFIRMED THAT A REACTION TO SADAT'S THREE ALTERNATIVES WOULD BE GIVEN AT NEXT SUNDAY'S CABINET MEETING. HE SAID HE WOULD "KEEP MUM". EVEN IF HE WAS INVITED TO EGYPT, AND AS YET THERE WAS NO SPECIFIC INVITATION, THE MOOD IN THE CABINET PROBABLY MEANT HE "WAS NOT GOING". SADAT WOULD SIMPLY HAVE TO STOP DECIDING WHO HE WANTS TO TALK TO.

13. RESPONDING TO WEIZMAN'S STATEMENT THAT THE CRUX OF SADAT'S MESSAGE WAS "GET HIM A FOOTHOLD", I ASKED IF THAT FOOTHOLD WOULD BE THROUGH A PEACE TREATY OR A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. WEIZMAN SAID NEITHER. THE ENCLAVE IN EL ARISH SEEMED MORE ON SADAT'S MIND. WEIZMAN SAID HE HAD NOT FORMED AN OPINION ABOUT THE IDEA, BUT THAT MOSHE DAYAN WAS TURNING OVER THE POSSIBILITY IN HIS MIND. NEITHER DAYAN NOR BEGIN HAD SAID NO TO THE POSSIBILITY AT TODAY'S CABINET MEETING.

14. NOT GIVING UP, I AGAIN TRIED TO PIN WEIZMAN DOWN ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PEACE TREATY AND WEST BANK/GAZA SPECIFICS. WHAT SEQUENCE DID SADAT HAVE IN MIND? WEIZMAN SAID IT WASN'T

CLEAR TO HIM, INDEED "IT WAS TRICKY". ISRAEL WAS TO GET
SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 180220

OUT OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, COULD KEEP ITS SECURITY FORCES THERE FOR A WHILE AND WOULD HAVE TO TERMINATE THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT. AT THAT POINT, HUSSEIN WOULD COME IN TO OVERSEE THE WEST BANK. WEIZMAN SAID THAT "WOULD NOT WORK WITH OUR GOVERNMENT". ANYWAY, IT WAS ALL TOO FUZZY. SADAT WOULD NOT GET INTO DETAILS AS HE HAD DONE ON MARCH 30.

15. WEIZMAN SAID HE HAD SUGGESTED TO SADAT THAT ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN TEAMS SHOULD BEGIN PERIODIC MEETINGS TO TRY TO GET AT THE DETAILS OF WEST BANK/GAZA ARRANGEMENTS. IN AUSTRIA, GAMASY HAD ARGUED FOR THE SAME THING. GAMASY THOUGHT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SEE WHERE THE TWO SIDES AGREED AND WHERE THEY DISAGREED. BUT THIS SORT OF THING, WEIZMAN STRESSED, WAS BECOMING MORE AND MORE DIFFICULT HERE. THE CABINET'S MOOD WAS INCREASINGLY SOUR. RETURNING TO SADAT'S THREE POSSIBILITIES BEFORE OCTOBER (WITHDRAWAL FROM MUCH OF THE SINAI, A PEACE TREATY, OR ENCLAVES AT EL ARISH AND ST. CATHERINE), I ASKED WEIZMAN WHAT SUCH AN ISRAELI GESTURE WOULD PRODUCE FROM SADAT. WOULD HE THEN AGREE TO CONTINUE THE PROCESS. WEIZMAN CONFIRMED THIS, BUT SAID THE NEXT STEPS WERE UNCLEAR: "WE AGREED, HE CONTINUES, THEN BLAH, BLAH, BLAH."

16. I ASKED WEIZMAN IF IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE AND PROFITABLE FOR SADAT TO SEE DAYAN AND HIM TOGETHER. HE SAID HE DIDN'T KNOW BUT SADAT MUST BE CONVINCED TO SEE BEGIN. INTERESTINGLY, GAMASY TOLD WEIZMAN IN SALZBURG THAT GAMASY BELIEVED HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO INFLUENCE BEGIN IF HE COULD SEE HIM. WEIZMAN HAD TOLD GAMASY TO COME ALONG BUT GAMASY HAD INDICATED THAT "HE HAD TO HAVE A MISSION". (THERE MAY BE A GERM OF AN IDEA HERE. WE WILL WANT TO THINK ABOUT WHETHER WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE GAMASY TO COME TO ISRAEL.)

17. ACCORDING TO WEIZMAN, NEITHER HE NOR SADAT WAS ENTHUSIASTIC
SECRET

PAGE 09 STATE 180220

ABOUT A PERMANENT UN PRESENCE IN THE SINAI. SADAT LIKES "YOU YOUNG AMERICAN AROUND." THE AMERICAN PRESENCE COULD BE "AT AN AIRFIELD, A CANOE AT SEA, A BALLON IN THE AIR." WEIZMAN THOUGHT HE SAW TWO CLEAR TRENDS IN SADAT'S THINKING. ONE WAS TO CONTINUE THE DIRECT TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS AND THE OTHER WAS TO INVOLVE THE US WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS. (SADAT MENTIONED HIS FRIENDSHIP WITH PRESIDENT CARTER SEVERAL TIMES.)

18. I ASKED WEIZMAN IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY DISCUSSION OF TOTAL VS. PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL. WEIZMAN SAID NO. SADAT HAD NOT MENTIONED MINOR BORDER MODIFICATIONS, REASONABLE BORDERS, ETC. ISRAEL WOULD WITHDRAW, THE IDF COULD STAY ON THE WEST BANK FOR

SOME PERIOD, AND THERE WOULD BE A UNITED JERUSALEM. DETAILS WOULD BE WORKED OUT LATER. WEIZMAN CONCLUDED HE WAS WORRIED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AFTER LONDON. WEIZMAN SAID THAT THE NEXT CRISIS WILL OCCUR WHEN HE IS AGAIN INVITED TO EGYPT. THE CABINET WOULD PROBABLY NOT LET HIM GO. I TOLD HIM THAT WE HAD HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT HIS NEXT VISIT TO ALEXANDRIA MIGHT OCCUR WITHIN THE NEXT TWO TO THREE DAYS. HE SHOT BACK "WHAT THE HELL FOR. IF SADAT THINKS I CAN MAKE A DEAL HERE ON EL ARISH THAT FAST, HE DOESN'T UNDERSTAND ANYTHING.

19. COMMENT: WEIZMAN'S OPTIMISTIC MOOD OF YESTERDAY HAD OBVIOUSLY BEEN DARKENED SOMEWHAT BY THIS MORNING'S CABINET MEETING. HE REMAINS CONVINCED OF SADAT'S SINCERITY, INTRIGUED BY SOME OF THE POSSIBILITIES OPENED UP IN THIS AND HIS PREVIOUS MEETINGS; VERY ANXIOUS TO FIND A WAY TO REACH AGREEMENT, BUT DISCOURAGED BY THE POLITICAL CROSS-CURRENTS IN THE CABINET AND DISMAYED BY SADAT'S CONTINUED PUBLIC EFFORT TO BELITTLE BEGIN AND TO TRY TO MANIFEST THE GOI'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. HE WANTS TO MAINTAIN HIS UNIQUE ROLE, YET SEES THAT HE MAY NOT BE ALLOWED TO DO SO IF SADAT'S "DIVIDE AND RULE" TACTICS CONTINUE.
LEWIS UNQTE CHRISTOPHER

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 26 sep 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: CAT-B, DEBRIEFINGS, MEETINGS, PEACE PLANS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 17 jul 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE180220
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter:
Enclosure: REPEAT TEL AVIV 8967
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: N780006-0310
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t197807106/baaaezgh.tel
Line Count: 351
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 7a70566b-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: NODIS EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS EXDIS
Reference: CAIRO 17127
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 23 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1857278
Secure: LOCK1
Status: NATIVE
Subject: WEIZMAN ON HIS TALKS WITH SADAT
TAGS: PEPR, PBOR, IS, EG, US, AU, (SADAT, ANWAR), (WEIZMAN, EZER)
To: JIDDA
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/7a70566b-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014